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Abstract The efﬁciency of hospitals is an important
political issue and has been the subject of a number of
studies. Most studies ﬁnd evidence for inefﬁciency but
provide no theoretical explanations for differences in efﬁ-
ciency. This study used principal agent theory to explain
differences in efﬁciency between hospitals. Two agency
issues are examined: (1) quality of care in the relationship
between hospital and patient, and (2) internal organisation,
i.e. the relationship between the hospital and its main
departments. It was found that efﬁciency and quality go
together. This implies that the potential harmful informa-
tion asymmetry between hospitals and patients does not
appear to be a major problem, because increasing efﬁ-
ciency does not seem to reduce quality. Further, we ﬁnd no
relationship between the efﬁciency of departments and the
efﬁciency of the entire hospital. The interest of hospital
departments is currently not in line with the interests of the
entire hospital.
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Introduction
In 2008, the total budget for health care was about 10% of
GNP in the Netherlands and it is growing rapidly. This
alone could explain the recent interest in the costs and
efﬁciency of health care among both politicians and
researchers. But this interest is certainly not new, and a
variety of instruments have been applied to gain insight
into factors relating costs and efﬁciency in health care. To
analyse efﬁciency, advanced econometric tools, such as
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)—independently intro-
duced by Aigner et al. [1] and Meussen and van den Broeck
[23]—and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), have been
used. Zuckerman et al. [34], Skinner [30], Newhouse [25]
and Dor [9] ﬁrst introduced SFA to the hospital sector in
1994. Numerous studies have since applied SFA in a
hospital setting (see [13] for a review). Ludwig et al. [21]
provide the ﬁrst study applying SFA to estimate the efﬁ-
ciency of Dutch hospitals. Studies using SFA, and also
DEA, have the advantage over studies using classical cost
functions that they compare hospitals with the best-per-
forming instead of with average-performing hospitals.
However, they use the assumption of ‘‘classical economic
theory’’ that organisations strive to realise one common
goal and that factors relating to agency issues that could
explain differences in costs and efﬁciency are not
addressed.
In this study, we examine how factors related to agency
issues explain differences in costs, efﬁciency and quality
using SFA. The principal agent framework is used to deﬁne
hypotheses regarding these explanations. In economic
theory, an agency relationship is deﬁned as an agreement in
which the principal delegates certain responsibilities to the
agent for which the agent receives a certain reward [16].
The agency literature emphasises that the agent has his own
utility function, which he maximises. This utility function
may coincide partly with the utility function of the prin-
cipal, but may also differ. The agent will then let his own
utility function prevail. The key issue in this relationship is
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principal. According to Arrow [2], this asymmetry can
have two advantages for the agent. The ﬁrst occurs because
the principal cannot evaluate whether the agent lets his own
utility function prevail. Secondly, as the productivity of the
agent can be measured only by indicators, the principal
cannot judge whether the agent acts in the interest of the
principal, or just tries to optimise the indicators. Some
examples show where agency issues arise in hospitals, and
how information asymmetry plays a role:
• The relationship between the hospital (more speciﬁ-
cally the medical specialist) and the patient. The patient
(the principal) has a health problem and delegates the
problem to the medical specialist (the agent). For the
patient, it is hard to judge how well he is treated by
the medical specialist.
• Inside the hospital, the hospital board (the principal)
hires medical specialists (agents) to treat patients. The
hospital board is not as well informed about the quality,
efﬁciency and effectiveness of the treatment as the
medical specialist is.
• Inside the hospital, another principal agent relationship
exists, in the relationship between the hospital board
(the principal) and departments, e.g. the ward and the
radiology departments (the agents). Again the manager
of, for example, the radiology department is much
better informed about the quality and necessity of
performing an X-ray than the hospital management.
In this study, we analyse two of these relationships
empirically and use them to explain hospital efﬁciency.
The ﬁrst concerns the relationship between the hospital and
the patient. Second, we analyse the relationship between
the hospital management and departmental managers. The
third relationship, that between hospital managers and
doctors, is not analysed further. Not because this relation-
ship is not interesting—it is very interesting indeed—but
because good quality data on the productivity of medical
specialists are not available.
Hospital–patient relationship from an agency
perspective
The relationship between a hospital and a patient can be
described within a typical principal agent framework. The
patient has to rely on the specialised knowledge of the
doctor and there is an asymmetry in information about
the treatment of the health problem. It is difﬁcult for the
patient to measure the performance of the hospital. The
hospital might thereby prefer to optimise its own utility
function, minimising costs as is mostly assumed in efﬁ-
ciency studies. This may come at the cost of the utility of the
patient, who has an interest in receiving high quality care.
The reasoning of Newhouse [25] is in line with this assumed
relationship. He states that differences in efﬁciency might
be attributed completely to differences in (unobserved)
quality. Many other studies have emphasised the need to
include quality measures in efﬁciency studies. Jacobs and
Dawson [15], for example, criticise current methods of
efﬁciency measurement in hospitals, because quality mea-
sures are not taken into account. This latter study [15] and
others (e.g. Fizel and Nunninkhoven [12]) argue that an
increase in the quality of health care is likely to require
additional inputs per unit of output, thereby implying lower
relative efﬁciency for higher quality providers.
In contrast with the criticism of frontier studies that
differences in inefﬁciency may simply reﬂect quality dif-
ferences, studies that are more management- and organi-
sation-orientated, argue that quality and efﬁciency
complement each other. Porter and Olmsted Teisberg [26],
for example, state that: ‘‘in health care, as in most indus-
tries cost and quality can improve simultaneously as pro-
viders prevent errors, boost efﬁciency, and develop
expertise.’’ Similar reasoning is found in Van Merode et al.
[32], who argue that departments in a hospital often strive
to optimise their own functioning independently of other
departments. From the hospital point of view, this is sub-
optimal. Hospitals that do not optimise follow a more
integrative approach where the hospital is organised toward
the client (focussed factories). In this approach, quality and
efﬁciency problems are solved simultaneously. This rea-
soning ﬁnds its origin in target engineering, where quality
and price preferences form the starting point in engineering
services, products and production systems. Van Merode
[31] states that this kind of organisation leads to better
quality from the perspective of the client, and higher efﬁ-
ciency because the number of transfer points is minimised
and learning can be performed systematically. This latter
reasoning does not imply that principal agent issues do not
arise between hospitals and patients. It does imply that the
utility functions of hospitals and patients do not differ that
much. The patient wants high quality of care. The hospital
will be concerned primarily with efﬁciency, but this is
positively associated with quality.
In short, we can state that, because of asymmetric
information between patients and doctors, hospitals might
economise on quality to gain efﬁciency. However, this
behaviour might not occur if hospitals that are efﬁcient also
deliver good quality care. Therefore, we hypothesise that
hospital efﬁciency and quality go together.
Internal organisation: the relationship between
the hospital and its departments
Within hospitals, interests may differ. To gain a good
understanding of these different interests within hospitals,
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123it is useful to describe hospital organisation. Van Merode
[31] states that most hospitals ‘‘have a functionalistic
structure: surgeons in the surgery department, clinical
chemistry in the laboratories, etc.’’
Most Dutch hospitals are organised as a functionalistic
organisation of medical disciplines and facilitating
departments as shown in Fig. 1. According to Van Merode
et al. [32], this functionalistic organisation implies that it is
difﬁcult to realise integration. To gain insight into the
different utility functions of hospitals and departments we
need to understand how Dutch hospitals are ﬁnanced.
Hospitals in the Netherlands receive a budget from the
government. This budget is based mainly on the number of:
• beds;
• medical specialists;
• outpatients;
• day care patients;
• inpatients;
• ward days.
Within the hospital, the budget is divided between the
departments by the hospital management. The amount of
this budget is usually ﬁxed for a year. Over the years,
variations in departmental budgets depend on the number of
(intermediate) products delivered by the departments, for
example, the number of ward days by the ward and the
number of X-rays by the radiology department. Principal
agent issues in the hospital can be understood from this
perspective. The hospital board (the agent) may be assumed
to strive toward efﬁcient treatment of all patients, physi-
cians may strive toward efﬁcient treatment of the patients
within their medical discipline, while departments may
strive toward efﬁcient production of their own intermediate
products. This optimisation of intermediate products might
interfere with the interests of the hospital as it strives toward
efﬁcient client treatment. For example, the ward might
prefer efﬁcient ward days, because the internal budget
system works that way. Efﬁcient ward days are partly in the
interest of the hospital management as well. However, the
hospital may also aim to shorten the length of stay, which
may interfere with the interests of the ward. This implies
that departments that are efﬁcient, as measured by their own
output, do not in fact contribute to the efﬁciency of the
hospital. Our second hypothesis is that hospital efﬁciency
and departmental efﬁciency are only partly related.
As Herzlinger [14] argues, there is no or little relation-
ship between the inefﬁciency of departments and the
inefﬁciency of the total hospital: losses in one part of the
organisation are compensated by proﬁts gained in other
parts. The nature of planning in hospitals has many simi-
larities with those of job shops. Departments are concerned
only with maximising the efﬁciency of their own processes.
The same reasoning can be found in Van Merode [31], who
states that, in a functionalistic organisation, departments
put their professionals at the centre: everything is organised
around the health care professional, not around the patient.
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123This leads to our third hypothesis: there is no relationship
between the efﬁciency of different hospital departments.
Data
For this study, we used a database constructed from annual
national hospital inquiries on ﬁnancial, personnel and
production data. This database includes data for all 118
Dutch general hospitals. Because of mergers and/or miss-
ing data, our dataset consists of 108 cross-sections with 424
observations in total for the years 1998–2002.
One of the main reasons for the lack of studies exam-
ining the efﬁciency of hospital departments may be the lack
of available data with which to perform this kind of anal-
ysis. In the Netherlands, however, data are available at
department level. We use these data to examine the efﬁ-
ciency of hospital departments. Complete data are not
available for all departments. Therefore the number of
observations per department can be less than 424.
This section describes the main input and output
parameters of our study.
Input prices
The usual inputs for hospitals are capital, staff and materials.
First, we discuss the price of capital. Capital is most fre-
quently measured by the costs of depreciation and interest
divided by a measure of the size of the hospital, mostly the
number of beds (see, for example, [34, 28]). In the Dutch
capitation system for hospitals, capital for investments in
buildings is provided by the government under strict regu-
lations.Boththeinvestmentsincapitalandtheloansforthese
investments have to be approved by the Dutch government.
Once approved, these costs are ﬁnanced by the Dutch gov-
ernment. Hospital management thus has little inﬂuence over
capital costs. Because of this, the price of capital is of little
interest from a managerial perspective. Therefore, we
exclude costs and capital prices from this study.
Second, we discuss the price of staff. We distinguish six
categories of staff: administrative staff, technical staff,
support staff (for example psychologists and physiothera-
pists), nurses, student nurses, and external staff. Since
external staff is a broad category and represents less than
3% of total staff, this category is left out of this study.
Administrative and technical staff are combined into one
category to obtain a category with a signiﬁcant size (about
5% of total staff). The price of staff is not directly avail-
able. It is calculated by dividing the total amount spent on
staff by the number of full-time equivalents. A price
parameter of staff is included in the analysis of each
department if the number of staff in the category is above
5% of the total number of staff.
A large fraction of hospital costs, approximately 60%, is
the cost of staff, mainly wages. A debatable issue in efﬁ-
ciency studies is whether the price of staff is exogenous or
endogenous to the hospital. To measure the price of staff,
twoapproaches canbedistinguishedinefﬁciencystudies.In
theﬁrstapproach,theaveragepriceoftheindividualhospital
isused.Inthisapproach,wagesareassumedtobeexogenous
to the hospital. In the second approach, the average national
price is used. In this approach, the difference between the
average national wage and the average wage of the indi-
vidual hospital is assumed to be endogenous to the hospital.
This study assumes wages to be exogenous since the most
wages are determined by central negotiations between the
labour unions and the Dutch National Association of Hos-
pitals. Athird, moresophisticated, approach would betouse
regionalprices.Regionaldifferencesinpricesareexogenous
to hospitals, while differences between regional and actual
prices are endogenous to the hospital. Regional differences
in prices can be estimated by a regression equation using
timedummiesandregionaldummies(intheNetherlands,27
health regions are distinguished). We have estimated these
equations. The results show that, in general, there are no
signiﬁcantpricedifferences betweenregions. Thisﬁnding is
in line with the study of Blank et al. [5], who use a compa-
rable dataset for earlier years. Therefore, in this study,
regional differences in prices are ignored.
Third, in addition to the prices of capital and staff, the
price of materials is an input parameter. In the dataset, total
costs of materials are available. Separate information on
prices and quantities is not available. In order to estimate
the price of material, a unit price is chosen in the base year
1998. In subsequent years, the price of material is calcu-
lated by adjusting prices by the price index for government
expenditure in the Netherlands [6].
Departments
This study distinguishes the following direct patient treat-
ment departments within a hospital:
1. ward;
2. outpatient department;
3. operating theatre;
4. radiology;
5. laboratory;
6. physiotherapy.
Costs
The dataset contains information on the number of staff per
category per department. Of each category of staff, the
average annual wage is calculated per hospital. The costs
of staff per department are calculated by multiplying the
294 M. Ludwig et al.
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This provides the direct costs of staff per department.
Because of differences in organisational structures and
differences in calculation methods between hospitals, it is
necessary to make an assumption about the allocation of
the costs of indirect staff members, such as the costs of
administration and technical staff. The costs of nurses and
student nurses are allocated to the direct patient treatment
departments based on the number of FTE nurses at the
direct patient treatment departments. The costs of other
staff are allocated to the direct patient treatment depart-
ments based on the total number of FTE at the direct
patient treatment departments. On average, we see that the
majority of costs of staff (73.9% of total wage costs,
varying from at most 74.6% in 1999 to at least 72.8% in
2002) concern costs of direct staff.
The costs of materials per department are not directly
available. The Dutch national cost-calculation scheme for
calculatingthecostsofmaterialsperdepartmentisused.This
calculation scheme has been developed to introduce case-
mix-basedfundingintheNetherlands.Itprovidesguidelines
to allocate costs of materials to direct patient treatment
departments.Forexample,allocationofthecostsofcleaning
is based on the number of square metres per department.
Since it is obligatory for hospitals to have an extensive cost
administration, we are able to use a detailed allocation.
In general, about 40% of total costs are costs of mate-
rials. In the operating theatre and radiology department, the
costs of materials are more than 50% of total costs. The
standard deviation is relatively low compared to the aver-
age. No large differences between hospitals in the per-
centage of material costs per department are found.
Including the allocated costs, the six departments distin-
guished in this study cover, on average, more than 90% of
total hospital costs (excluding costs of capital). As argued
above, the costs of capital for buildings are left out of the
analysis. This implies that, on average, 12% of the total
costs is left out of the analysis.
Outputs
Hospital
To measure the output of hospitals, ﬁve output parameters
are used. First, Diagnostic Related Group (DRG)-weighted
admissions are used. Although the DRG system was
developed more than 25 years ago by Fetter et al. [11], this
method of measuring output is new for Dutch hospitals. In
2002, a Dutch version of the IR-DRG grouper was devel-
oped, which is used in this study. The Dutch version of the
IR-DRG grouper uses the ICD-9 diagnosis codes and
Dutch CVV procedure codes, which are quite similar to
ICD procedure codes.
This study uses the Dutch DRG cost-weights calculated
by Vandermeulen et al. [33] for both admissions and day-
care admissions. Since no DRGs exist for outpatient visits,
the non-weighted number of ﬁrst outpatient visits is addi-
tionally used as an output measure.
Besides curing patients, hospitals have two other
important outputs: research and teaching. Research is done
mainly in university hospitals, which are excluded from
this study. On the contrary, teaching is performed by 83 of
the 108 non-university hospitals represented in our data-
base. Teaching is measured by the average number of
medical specialists trained in the hospital.
As a last output variable, a dummy for the existence of
an emergency department is included. A dummy variable is
chosen for two reasons. First, the availability of the
emergency department and the number of specialists and
nurses working there is important in itself, even if no
patients turn up. Second, the registration of the production
of emergency departments is of poor quality and therefore
underestimated by the available data.
Departments
The outputs of similar departments in different hospitals
are more homogeneous than the outputs of total hospitals.
The outputs of hospital departments are equal to the out-
puts charged to patients and insurance companies. There-
fore the outputs per department used in this study are
reliable and valid measures. The outputs per department
are brieﬂy discussed.
Ward The most straightforward production of the ward is
the number of ward days. Ward days can be subdivided
into ward days in an inpatient setting, a day care setting and
an intensive care setting. Since previous studies have
shown that the workload differs between the ﬁrst ward day
and subsequent ward days, four different categories of
ward days are distinguished:
• ﬁrst ward days;
• following ward days;
• day care ward days;
• intensive care ward days.
The outputs require inputs from all four different cate-
gories of staff. Therefore four input prices are distinguished
as input measures for the ward.
Outpatient department Most patients start their treatment
inahospitalbyvisitingtheoutpatientdepartment.Follow-up
treatments and check-ups are also performed in the outpa-
tient department. Small operations, such as vasectomy, are
increasinglyperformedinoutpatientdepartmentsaswell.To
summarise, we distinguish three different output measures:
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• other outpatient visits;
• small operations.
The operations are weighted by the operation’s tariff.
These tariffs are determined by the Dutch Central Orga-
nisation on Tariffs. The outpatient department staff consists
mostly of general staff, support staff and nurses. The prices
of these three kinds of staff are used for this department.
Operating theatre Most operations are performed in the
operating theatre. We use the weighted number of opera-
tions performed as an output measure of the operating
theatre. These operations are weighted by their tariffs. In
the operating theatre, staff inputs consist mostly of nurses,
general staff and support staff. The prices of these three
categories of staff are used for this department.
Radiology The radiology department produces X-rays.
We use the total number of X-rays, including MRI- and CT-
scans, as output measures. X-rays are weighted by their
tariffs. In the radiology department, the staff in most hos-
pitals consists of general staff and support staff. The prices
of these two categories of staff are used for this department.
Laboratory Two types of laboratories can be distin-
guished: the clinical chemistry laboratory and the pathology
laboratory. We include only the clinical chemistry labora-
tory, because too few hospitals possess a pathology labo-
ratory. The outputs for the laboratory are lab-tests. Lab-tests
are weighted by their tariffs. Laboratory staff in most hos-
pitals consists of support staff and general staff. The prices
of these two categories of staff are used for this department.
Physiotherapy The physiotherapy department consists
mainly of occupational and physical therapists. The main
output of the physiotherapy department is hours of indi-
vidual physiotherapeutic treatment. Next to individual
physiotherapeutic treatments, other outputs, such as physio-
therapeutic research and physiotherapeutic treatment in
groups, are produced. These outputs are taken together and
weighted by their tariffs to form one output measure. In the
physiotherapy department, the staff in most hospitals
consists of support staff and general staff. The prices of
these two categories of staff are used for this department.
Quality
There are a few indicators that are widely recognised as
measures of quality. These indicators mostly measure out-
come and include, for example, the number of re-admis-
sions, death-rates and complications. In fact, they measure
quality as the outcome of the medical process. Davies and
Crombie [8] give two reasons why outcomes as a measure
of quality should be treated with care. First, outcome indi-
cators depend on case mix. Hospitals treating more com-
plicated diseases have higher death- and complication-rates,
irrespective of their quality. When the quality of the whole
hospital is the unit of measurement, case-mix-adjusted
quality measures are needed. Second, outcome indicators
have less than optimal validity and reliability as they are
often hard to measure. Third, as shown by Mant and Hicks
[22], outcome indicators can fail to reveal process differ-
ences. For example, big differences in processes for the
treatment of acute myocardial infarction are not found when
comparing death rates. Even when a process is known to be
better, death-rates do not show these differences.
Because of the disadvantages of outcome indicators,
process indicators have become more important as a mea-
sure of quality of health care. In this study we use process
indicators as measures of quality. We use the quality mea-
sures developed by the Dutch weekly paper Elsevier [10].
Elsevier is a large Dutch news weekly, comparable to Time
or Newsweek. Elsevier has measured quality since 1997.
Between 1997 and 2001, only one-half or less of Dutch
hospitals were included in the study. Since 2002 the per-
centage of participating hospitals has increased to approx-
imately 80% of all Dutch hospitals. Quality is measured by
a survey conducted among general practitioners (GPs), the
medical staff, nurses and managers of the hospital. These
stakeholders are best informed about the quality of the
hospital. They can help reduce the information asymmetry
between the patient and the hospital. Each of these stake-
holders is asked a number of questions about the hospital
they are involved with. On every question they are asked
whether the situation is appropriate to their hospital. A
hospital receives 1 point if, on a positive item, 20–32% of
the respondents perceive it as being appropriate, 2 points if
between 33 and 49% of the respondents ﬁnd the situation
appropriate, and 3 points if 50% or more ﬁnd the situation
appropriate. On weak items the same holds with negative
scores. In 2004, the survey was divided into four factors:
• Medical and nursing quality (quality of the emergency
department, operating theatre, nursing staff).
• Organisational quality (well organised and a good
employer).
• Quality of care process (cooperation with GPs and
nursing homes).
• Quality of patient care (patient friendly).
• Factor 1: Medical and nursing quality is measured by
six positively and two negatively formulated questions.
The score on this factor is therefore between -6 and
18. Questions in this part of the survey refer to medical
and nursing expertise, quality of the operating theatre
and medical mistakes.
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positively and six negatively formulated questions. The
score on this factor is therefore between -18 and ?18.
Question on this part of the survey refer to: quality of
management, quality of information technology (IT),
preparation for changing demographic factors (growing
age of the population), bad ﬁnancial situation, internal
problems, and lack of staff.
• Factor 3: Quality of the care process is measured by six
positively and three negatively formulated items. The
score on this factor is therefore between -9 and 18.
Questions in this part of the survey refer to: cooperation
with general practitioners and nursing homes, good
coordination with general practitioners, slow and
arrogant medical specialists.
• Factor 4: Quality of patient care is measured by eight
positively and two negatively formulated questions.
The score on this factor can therefore be between -6
and 24. Questions in this part of the survey refer to:
being friendly to the patient, appreciated by the patient,
friendly staff, patient-friendly planning and length of
waiting lists.
In 2004, the questionnaire was sent to 5,578 respon-
dents, of which 25% replied. At least 15 respondents are
required before the results of a hospital are presented. In
earlier years fewer factors and questions were used.
Moreover, in 2004, more hospitals were included. Because
of these two reasons we use the outcomes of the year 2004
as quality measures in this study. Using the quality measure
of just 1 year comes with the disadvantage of assuming
quality does not change over time. We prefer using the
better quality data of 2004 over using a time varying
measure that is available for fewer hospitals and is of lesser
quality. We use all four quality factors as efﬁciency-
explaining variables in this study.
Econometric methods
This study uses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) as
developed by Aigner et al. [1] for estimation. The SFA
technique was developed to estimate ﬁrm and time varying
efﬁciency levels. A stochastic frontier equation, based on
panel data, can be written as follows:
yit ¼ fðxit;bÞ expðvitÞ TEit ð1Þ
where [f(xit;b)*exp(vit)] is the stochastic frontier (see
Kumbhakar and Lovell [18] for a more detailed descrip-
tion). TEit measures technical efﬁciency of ﬁrm i at time t.
TEit can be any value between zero and one.
This study uses panel data. The use of panel data in a
stochastic frontier model has a number of methodological
advantages over cross-section data. Linna [20] shows that
hospital efﬁciency estimates are more plausible when using
panel data compared to cross-sectional data. Further,
Jondrow et al. [17] show that consistency issues arise with
individual efﬁciency scores in a cross-section approach.
We have to choose a functional form for f(xit;b). This
study uses a Cobb-Douglas cost function. In other studies
the translog cost function, which is an extension of the
Cobb-Douglas cost function, has been used [20, 28]. The
advantage of the translog cost function over the Cobb-
Douglas function is its ﬂexibility. Whether to use translog
or Cobb-Douglas is an issue addressed by a number of
studies. Some studies in the hospital sector, for example
Rosko [27], conduct a formal test of the Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation and reject this speciﬁcation. Mortimer and
Peacock [24] found no statistical justiﬁcation for the tran-
slog function. We also estimated a translog model. How-
ever, some of these models did not converge. As argued by
Mortimer and Peacock [24], Cobb-Douglas is better
because of parsimony. Latruffe et al. [19] further argue
that: ‘‘Translog tends to be over speciﬁed when limited
data are available’’. Some of our translog estimations
indeed did not converge. Therefore, we use the Cobb-
Douglas function in this study.
The Cobb-Douglas cost function reads as:
ln
TCk;it
wt
¼ ak;0 þ
X mk
l¼1
ak;lYkl;it þ
X qk
j¼1
bk;j ln
Pj;it
wt
þ ek;it
8k ¼ 1;...;6 8i ¼ 1;...;Nk 8t ¼ 1;...;Tk;i ð2Þ
where
k counter for departments, k = 1 for the total
hospital
mk number of products for department k. mk = 4 for
the ward, 3 for the outpatient department, 1 in the
other departments
qk number of price parameters included for
department k, see data section
Nk number of observations for department k
Tk,i number of time periods available for department k
and hospital i. Maximum is 4 for radiology and 5
for all other departments
TCk,it costs of department k in hospital i in year t,
Vk = 1,…,6 i = 1,…, Nk, t = 1,…,Tk,i
Ykl,it production of product l in department k for hospital
i in year t
Vk 1,…,6 i = 1,…, Nk, t = 1,…,Tk,i, l = 1,…,mk
Pj,it price of input factor j in department k for hospital i
in year t
Vj 1,…,qk Vk = 1,…,6 i = 1,…,N, t = 1,…,Ti
wt price of input factor j in department k for hospital i
in year t, Vt = 1,…,5
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123ek,it Error term for department k in hospital i at time t,
Vk=1,…,6 i = 1,…,Nk, t=1,…,Tk,i
ak,o, ak,l, bk,j, are parameters to be estimated.
Assuming that:
ek;it ¼ uk;i þ mk;it 8k ¼ 1;...;6 ð3Þ
vk,it * N(0,r2
v;k) represents random statistical noise.
uk,i * N
?(l,r2
u;k) represents time-invariant cost
inefﬁciency.
The speciﬁcation in Eqs. 1–3 leads to a stochastic
frontier approach with efﬁciency varying for each depart-
ment per hospital, but assumed to be constant over time. To
estimate time-varying efﬁciency, the parameterisation
introduced by Battese and Coelli [3] is used.
uk;it ¼ gk;ituk;i ¼f exp½ gkðt   Ti gui
8k ¼ 1;...;6 i ¼ 1;...;Nk; t ¼ 1;...;Tk;i
ð4Þ
uk,it is time variant inefﬁciency and gk is parameters to be
estimated.
The parameterization in Eq. 4 requires one additional
parameter to be estimated. This parameterisation allows for
the efﬁciency parameter lk,it to remain constant, increase
or decrease over time. The gk parameters describe whether
the efﬁciency of a department has increased (gk[0) or
decreased (gk\0). To test whether the efﬁciency change is
signiﬁcant (gk\ [0), it sufﬁces to apply a t test.
The efﬁciency at time t of department k in hospital i,i s
calculated as follows
Effk;it ¼ expðuk;itÞ: ð5Þ
To explain efﬁciency, Battese and Coelli [4] developed a
one-stage model. We estimated this one-stage model. This
model did not converge. We therefore decided to use a less
sophisticated two-stage model. The ﬁrst stage is the model
described in Eqs. 1–5. In the second stage we perform a
separate regression analysis to explain efﬁciency. We
regress the expected value of the efﬁciency parameters
(Eq. 6) on our set of quality variables.
Effi ¼ a0 þ
X 4
j¼1
bj qualityj;i þ ei ð6Þ
Effi ¼
X Ti
i¼1
Effit=Ti; 8i
Qualityj,i is the quality measure for the j-th quality variable
for the i-th hospital, a0, bj are parameters to be estimated.
We perform a comparable analysis for the departments:
Effi;t ¼ a0 þ
X 6
k¼1
bk Effk;it þ ei;t: ð7Þ
Estimation
The program frontier 4.1 developed by Coelli [7] is used to
estimate the parameters in Eqs. 2–4. This program uses a
maximum likelihood approach with OLS estimates as
starting values. According to Schmidt and Sickles [29], the
advantage is that these ML-estimators are consistent and
asymptotically efﬁcient as N ? ?, regardless of T.
Another advantage of the maximum likelihood approach is
the ability to perform statistical tests.
The estimation procedure is performed for the total
hospital and the six different departments. To improve the
estimation procedure, instead of maximising with respect
to the parameters r2
u and r2
v, the program maximises the
likelihood equation using the parameters c and S
2, where
c ¼ r2
l=ðr2
u þ r2
vÞ
S2 ¼ r2
v þ r2
u:
ð8Þ
Testing the signiﬁcance of the parameter c, i.e. testing
the signiﬁcance of r2
u, shows whether a stochastic frontier
function is required at all.
After this maximisation procedure, estimators can be
derived for r2
l andr2
v from Eq. 6.
The efﬁciency for department k in hospital i at time t can
be estimated by
Effk;it ¼ 1=expðuk;itÞ: ð9Þ
Equation 9 ﬁnally provides the efﬁciency estimation
for both total hospital organisations and individual
departments.
Estimation results
The variables, and their descriptive statistics, used in this
study are listed in Table 1.
The ﬁgures in Table 1 reﬂect the increasing costs per
hospital in the Netherlands. This is a consequence of the
decreasing number of hospitals, an increasing production,
and increasing salaries. Hospitals still vary considerably in
size. The costs between the smallest and the largest hos-
pital in our database vary by a factor 10. Variation
between hospitals is also seen in quality scores. The dif-
ference between the minimum and maximum scores on all
four quality measures is about 20; the standard deviation
is around 4 for all measures. These results show that
professionals perceive signiﬁcant differences in quality
between hospitals. Both quality and costs vary between
hospitals and hospital departments. The SFA must answer
the questions to what extent efﬁciency affects the increase
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123in hospitals’ costs over time, and to what extent quality
and departmental efﬁciency are related to hospital
efﬁciency.
Table 1 further presents the average costs per treatment
in the different departments after the removal of outliers
(5% of the departments with the highest and 5% with the
lowest prices per output measure). This removal is neces-
sary since we see variations in prices per output measure
between years within hospitals that are between 2 and 10:
i.e. 200–1,000% price changes between years. For the
physiotherapy department, these ﬂuctuations are some-
times even higher. These outliers are removed from the
data. The remainder of this section presents the results of
the efﬁciency analysis based on the data without outliers.
Table 2 presents the results of the SFA for the total
hospital and six individual departments. The parameters
that represent the production in the total hospital estima-
tions is highly signiﬁcant (P\0.01). The parameter esti-
mate for the weighted admission is approximately four
times as high as the parameter estimate for day-care, and
three times as high as the parameter estimate for outpa-
tients. The total of the parameter estimates for the pro-
duction measures are approximately equal to 1. This
indicates the absence of both diseconomies and economies
of scale in Dutch hospitals. The parameter l is statistically
signiﬁcant. This shows that an ‘ordinary’ N
?(0,rl) distri-
bution is rejected. Efﬁciency is estimated by the parameters
c and S
2, see Eq. 5. Based on this equation, the error
component (rv) and efﬁciency component (rl) can be
calculated. rl exceeds rv by more than a factor of 50. This
indicates that inefﬁciency plays a bigger role than random
variation. Together with the signiﬁcance of the estimates
for c, which measures the relative size of rl compared to
rv, this suggests that inefﬁciency exists in Dutch hospitals
and that there are differences in inefﬁciency between Dutch
hospitals.
Table 2 further shows the results for individual depart-
ments separately. The parameters representing the pro-
duction variables are statistically signiﬁcant (P\0.01) for
all departments. This suggests that the production param-
eters distinguished in this study reﬂect true differences in
the production of the departments. This is also shown by
the R
2-measures for the OLS-equations, which vary
between 0.76 and 0.95. The price parameters provide a less
consistent picture. Most estimates are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level. Some parameter estimates are even
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables used in this study
Min Max Mean SD Mean 1998 Mean 2002
Dependent variable
Total costs (€1,000) 12,910 217,056 61,280 34,327 50,589 76,351
Explanatory variables
Length of stay 4.7 11.3 8.1 1.0 8.7 7.3
Ward days 29,112 302,328 108,921 52,256 113,390 104,924
Day-care 1,838 24,921 7,658 3,795 6,369 9,568
Admissions 3,597 36,576 13,257 5,897 12,778 14,291
Ambulatory care patients 18,551 227,531 75,927 34,775 60,781 85,405
Clinical DRG-weight 0.76 1.32 0.94 0.09 0.92 0.95
Average costs
Cost per patient (inpatient ? day-care) 1,784 4,689 2,817 512 2,555 3,101
Costs per average DRG (inpatient) 2,999 7,151 4,754 749 4,158 5,460
Quality variables
Care 0 17 9.5 3.9
Organisation -3 15 4.9 3.2
Cooperation -5 13 3.8 4.2
Patient friendly -3 16 6.2 4.1
Cost prices intermediate products
Ward 216 377 290 43 195 256
Outpatient 38 113 78 17 80 85
Operating theatre 611 1,282 918 160 952 957
Radiology 0.81 1.18 0.97 0.09 0.95
Laboratory 1.80 3.69 2.52 0.43 102 106
Physiotherapy 0.8 3.1 1.3 0.4 1.13 1.45
DRG Diagnostic related group
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123statistically non-signiﬁcant or negative. This is probably
due to multicollinearity in the price variables. All corre-
lation coefﬁcients between the price variables are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and positive and vary between 0.08 for the
correlation between the price of students and support staff,
and 0.43 between the price of support staff and nurses. The
statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimates conﬁrm our
expectations. The price of nurses signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
the costs of the ward. The price of technical staff has a
signiﬁcant effect on the costs of the operating theatre, the
laboratory and the physiotherapy department.
The signiﬁcance of the efﬁciency differences of the
departments between hospitals is measured by the signiﬁ-
cance of the parameter estimate for c. The ﬁnding that c is
highly statistically (P\0.01) signiﬁcant for all depart-
ments leads to the conclusion that efﬁciency differences of
hospital departments between hospitals exist. The ﬁnding
that rl, which measures the variation in efﬁciency, is much
(at least a factor 35) larger than rm, which measures random
variation, adds to this conclusion. The conclusion holds for
all six departments included in this study: ward, outpatient,
operating theatre, radiology, laboratory and physiotherapy.
To obtain more insight into the variation in efﬁciency
between departments Table 3 presents the mean efﬁciency
estimates for the six different departments. The highest
mean efﬁciency, namely 85%, is found for the ward. The
lowest mean efﬁciency is found for the outpatient depart-
ment (70%).
Table 3 further presents the change in efﬁciency over
time, measured by the parameter g. Two departments, the
operating theatre and the laboratory, increased their efﬁ-
ciency over time. Compared to other departments, these
two are less dependent on staff (46% of both departments).
The other departments show a decreasing efﬁciency over
time. The estimated time varying efﬁciency change is
signiﬁcant for both the ward and the physiotherapy
Table 2 Parameter estimates of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA; t values in brackets)
Total hospital Ward Outpatient Operating
theatre
Radiology Laboratory Physiotherapy
No. of observations 258 282 278 173 193 237
Explanatory variables (production)
(Weighted) admissions 0.64 (20.34)
(Weighted) day-care 0.14 (6.03)
First outpatient visit 0.23 (8.6)
Education 0 (3.23)
First-aid 0.01 (1.01)
First ward day 0.41 (5.8)
Other ward days 0.40 (7.0)
Day-care 0.25 (5.53)
First outpatient visit 0.52 (6.3)
Other outpatient visit 0.49 (6.6)
Weighted procedure 0.01 (0.2)
Weighted operations 0.87 (26.3)
Weighted X-rays 0.99 (38.9)
Weighted lab-research 0.88 (33.3)
Weighted physio hours 0.8 (15.0)
Explaining variables (prices)
P_general_staff 0.35 (4.52) 0.23 (2.8) 0.33 (2.5) -0.06 (-0.4) -0.07 (-0.7) -0.13 (-1.2) 0.09 (0.5)
P_nurses 0.13 (3.0) 0.43 (3.8) 0.81 (4.9) 0.22 (1.3)
P_Students 0.01 (0.8)
P_support -0.02 (-0.4) 0.06 (0.5) 0.22 (1.7) 0.29 (1.9) 0.19 (1.6) 0.42 (2.4) 0.63 (2.0)
Variables explaining efﬁciency
r
2 0.01 (5.2) 0.02 (4.6) 0.07 (5.8) 0.04 (4.9) 0.02 (5.2) 0.03 (4.6) 0.19 (2.6)
c 0.79 (30.1) 0.66 (13.3) 0.78 (24.2) 0.73 (11.7) 0.68 (12.8) 0.82 (17.9) 0.88 (19.0)
l 0.17 (6.4) 0.21 (5.6) 0.48 (8.6) 0.31 (4.2) 0.21 (4.8) 0.3 (4.3) 0.42 (2.0)
m -0.02 (0.8) -0.12 (2.8) -0.03 (1.6) 0.01 (0.4) -0.01 (0.2) 0.01 (0.3) -0.09 (3.5)
rv 0.01 0.011 0.057 0.028 0.011 0.024 0.168
rl 0.78 0.649 0.725 0.704 0.671 0.791 0.715
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123department. The processes of these departments depend
more on staff (73 and 77% of costs, respectively), and
therefore efﬁciency gains are probably more difﬁcult to
achieve.
Table 4 presents the relationship between efﬁciency and
quality of the hospital. Table 4 shows that three out of four
quality parameters are positively and statistically signiﬁ-
cant correlated to efﬁciency. The fourth parameter, quality
of care, is correlated negatively with efﬁciency but this is
not statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that more efﬁ-
cient hospitals also are better organised, have a better
cooperation with other health care providers, and are more
patient friendly.
Table 4 further presents the results of the regression
analysis where efﬁciency is the dependent variable and the
quality variables are the explanatory variables. In the
regression analysis, only one of the individual efﬁciency
parameter estimates, the parameter estimate for patient
friendly treatment, is positive and statistically signiﬁcantly
different from 0. The lack of statistical signiﬁcance in the
regression analysis for variables that are statistically sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with efﬁciency can be explained by
multicollinearity. The four quality variables together
explain 15.8% (adjusted R
2 = 0.158) of the inefﬁciency of
hospitals. This 15.8% can be interpreted as maximum
possible savings that can be realized by improving quality.
This is an interesting ﬁgure, especially considering that the
annual costs of general hospitals are about €10 billion.
Table 5 presents the correlation coefﬁcients between the
efﬁciency estimates of the total hospital and the efﬁciency
estimates of the individual department. Table 5 shows that
the correlations between the efﬁciency of the different
departments and the total hospital are all below 0.40. The
efﬁciency of the ward, the outpatient department and the
operating theatre are signiﬁcantly and positively correlated
with the efﬁciency of the total hospital. The efﬁciency of
the outpatient department, the radiology and the laboratory
are not signiﬁcantly correlated with the efﬁciency of the
hospital. The mutual correlations between the efﬁciency
estimates of the departments are all below 0.32, and 10 out
of 15 correlation estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Our general conclusion is that the efﬁciency of depart-
ments in a hospital is mostly independent of the efﬁciency
of other departments in the same hospital, and is inde-
pendent of the efﬁciency of the total hospital. The
departmental efﬁciency is, for three out of six departments,
not statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with the efﬁciency
of the total hospital. For departments whose efﬁciency is
signiﬁcantly correlated with hospital efﬁciency, the corre-
lation coefﬁcient is less than 0.45.
As described in the Introduction, this lack of relation-
ship between the efﬁciency of departments and the efﬁ-
ciency of the total hospital can be explained by the fact that
departments and hospitals do not strive toward common
goals. It seems that departments have an incentive to
maximise the efﬁciency of their department, which may
conﬂict with maximising efﬁciency at the hospital level.
Whether this is really the case can be tested. If the lack of a
relationship between hospital efﬁciency and departmental
efﬁciency is due to poor cooperation as we presume, we
expect that a high efﬁciency score for departments and a
low efﬁciency for the total hospital goes together with low
Table 3 Mean efﬁciency per department per year
Department 1998 (%) 1999 (%) 2000 (%) 2001 (%) 2002 (%) Total (%)
Ward 88.4 86.5 84.8 83.1 81.1 84.9
Outpatient 64.4 62.8 61.6 59.7 60.0 61.8
Operating theatre 72.0 73.5 73.4 72.4 71.5 72.6
Radiology N/A 81.6 80.5 80.8 79.8 80.7
Laboratory 75.7 74.2 73.7 73.6 72.9 74.0
Physiotherapy 74.7 73.4 70.5 67.7 64.3 69.9
Table 4 Correlations and regressions of mean efﬁciency on four quality variables
Correlation Regression
Correlation coefﬁcient P value Beta t value P value
Constant 8.02E-01 34.42 0.00
Patient friendly 0.35 0.00 4.67E-03 2.08 0.04
Cooperation 0.28 0.01 2.06E-03 0.72 0.47
Organisation 0.21 0.06 2.14E-03 0.84 0.41
Care -0.10 0.39 -3.26E-03 -1.54 0.13
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123cooperation. Cooperation is one of the quality variables in
this study. Table 6 provides the scores for this variable for
four groups of hospitals. These groups are based on the
efﬁciency scores of the total hospital organisation and of
the departments of these hospitals. Hospitals are divided
into two groups on both variables: 50% of the hospitals
with the highest scores in group 1, 50% with the lowest
scores in group 2.
As we can see from Table 6, hospitals that have both
high total hospital efﬁciency and high departmental efﬁ-
ciency also have the highest score on variable cooperation.
The group of hospitals with low efﬁciency of both total
hospital and departments scores second best. We see an
interaction between hospital efﬁciency and departmental
efﬁciency on the cooperation score. The statistical effect of
this interaction can be tested by a simple Anova F-test.
This F-test shows that both the efﬁciency of the hospital
and the efﬁciency of the department have no statistically
signiﬁcant relationship with cooperation. However, the
interaction effect is signiﬁcant on the 5% level (P = 0.41).
This result conﬁrms our expectation that departments with
a high efﬁciency within a hospital with a low efﬁciency at
the hospital level show worst cooperation. Cooperation is a
key issue for hospitals to achieve high efﬁciency both on
total hospital level and department level.
Discussion
This study analysed the efﬁciency of hospitals and of hos-
pital departments. Corroborating our ﬁrst hypothesis as well
as the ﬁndings of most previous studies, we do not ﬁnd that
efﬁciency can be explained by a lack of quality. On the
contrary, we ﬁnd that efﬁciency and quality go together.
They are complements rather than substitutes. This provides
new evidence that efﬁciency differences between hospitals
cannot be explained simply by quality differences.
We ﬁnd supportive evidence for our second hypothesis
that hospital efﬁciency differs from departmental efﬁ-
ciency. In most Dutch hospitals, departments are ﬁnanced
for the intermediate products they produce. This leads to an
interest that is (partly) different from the interests of the
entire hospital. Our results show that cooperation is a key
issue in achieving high efﬁciency in both departmental and
the total hospital organisation.
Our third hypothesis was also conﬁrmed: there is hardly
any relationship between the efﬁciency of different hospital
departments. First, this ﬁnding can be a result of the cap-
itation system of hospitals. Because hospitals receive a
budget, efﬁciency in one department can compensate for
inefﬁciency in another department. Second, this ﬁnding
could result from the way a hospital is organised [31],
because this ﬁnding suggests that the inefﬁciency of
departments depends mainly on department managers and
less on the general board of the hospital. This idea is
supported by our ﬁnding that hospitals that score low on
departmental efﬁciency and high on hospital efﬁciency,
and vice versa, score lower on the quality measure coop-
eration than hospitals that score high on both measures.
Our ﬁndings imply that striving for efﬁciency within
hospital departments contributes only partly to improving
the efﬁciency of hospitals. This ﬁnding has policy and
Table 5 Correlations between efﬁciency of departments and the total hospital
Department Total Ward Outpatient Operating theatre Radiology Laboratory
Ward Correlation 0.29
P value 0.00
Outpatient Correlation 0.09 -0.01
P value 0.11 0.87
Operating theatre Correlation 0.40 0.14 -0.13
P value 0.00 0.06 0.04
Radiology Correlation 0.12 0.03 0.16 -0.01
P value 0.12 0.74 0.04 0.90
Laboratory Correlation -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 -0.03
P value 0.87 0.95 0.51 0.19 0.74
Physiotherapy Correlation 0.31 0.24 -0.02 0.32 0.02 0.25
P value 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.83 0.00
Table 6 Score of quality measure cooperation in high and low hos-
pital and department efﬁciency groups
Efﬁciency of total hospital
Efﬁciency of departments High Low
High 5.7 (0.6) 3.1 (0.9)
Low 4.5 (0.8) 5.1 (0.7)
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123managerial implications, since the organisational and
ﬁnancial structures of Dutch hospitals are often functional
and aimed at creating efﬁcient departments. Organisational
structures that facilitate efﬁcient treatment of patients are
less common. This implies that Dutch hospitals accept
inefﬁciency in their organisations because of their func-
tionalistic structure. In such structures, goals of department
managers differ partially from goals of the hospital, since
the budgeting system of most Dutch hospitals maximises
the efﬁciency of intermediate products instead of maxi-
mising the utility of the total hospital. The changing
ﬁnancing system in Dutch hospitals, where case-mix-based
funding is being introduced to replace of ﬁnancing indi-
vidual procedures, might help in improving the efﬁciency
of hospitals. Case-mix-based funding might also lead to a
client-driven organisational structure for hospitals. How-
ever, case-mix-based funding is not sufﬁcient to maximise
efﬁciency. Even in case mix reimbursement systems, the
practice is often that third party payers buy packages of
often unrelated services to avoid (in the phrasing of health
care providers) ‘‘cherry picking’’ [31]. Inefﬁciency as a
result of bad integration of the health care chain inside (and
outside) the hospital will disappear only if case mix
reimbursement is applied without package buying, and if
efﬁciency and effectiveness is rewarded at the case level
and not at the intermediary product level. Applying a
combination of case mix and health care chain reim-
bursement is done on a small scale in a number of countries
nowadays. Until now, these are small scale implementa-
tions of another reimbursement policy, which could in
principle promote integration of the health care chain.
However, there is not yet enough evidence that it will
really promote integration and prevent the suboptimisation
we observe here.
To conclude, if we consider the ﬁnding that quality and
efﬁciency go together from an agency perspective, it could
be concluded that potential quality problems that may arise
because of information asymmetry between hospitals and
their patients may not be as harmful as is commonly
believed. This conclusion could be true because the interest
of the patient (good quality) goes together with the interest
of the hospital (efﬁciency) if the latter has the utility of the
patient in mind. Although this is perhaps an unexpected
ﬁnding in a health care efﬁciency study, studies in man-
agement science, for example Porter and Olmsted Teisberg
[26] and Van Merode [31] have already considered that
efﬁciency and quality are complements. Such studies
emphasise that the way a hospital is organised, inﬂuences
both quality and efﬁciency simultaneously and in the same
direction.
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